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Abstract
During the past fifty years, federal disaster policy in the United States has been shaped by
an ongoing conflict between proponents who favor federal intervention following a disaster and
those who believe disaster response should be the responsibility of state and local governments
and charity. This article explores the existing federal disaster policy landscape within the United
States with a focus on the Stafford Act, the cultural and political forces that produced it, and how
the current system is ill equipped to aid in the response and recovery from major catastrophes.
The Stafford Act defines how federal disasters are declared, determines the types of assistance to
be provided by the federal government, and establishes cost sharing arrangements among federal,
state, and local governments. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) carries out
the provisions of the Stafford Act and distributes much of the assistance provided by the Act. With
the establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the threat of domestic terrorism,
and large-scale natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina, the limits of the Stafford Act and FEMA
have been shown. We look at several areas where the shortcomings of the Stafford Act have
emerged and propose directions for reform.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal disaster policy in the United States has been shaped by an ongoing 
conflict between those who favor federal intervention following a disaster and 
those who believe disaster response should be the responsibility of state and local 
governments and charity. The net result is a complex system of regulations and 
government agencies responsible for disaster management created by cobbling 
together previously existing federal agencies with their own cultures, policies, 
objectives, and constituencies. 
 Multiple layers of law and regulations – the Stafford Act, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 
2006, and the National Response Framework– mean a disaster can simultaneously 
be declared a Major Disaster, a Catastrophic Incident, and an Incident of National 
Significance – and be responded to in accordance with the provisions of all of 
those laws, resulting in confusion as to which set of regulations apply during a 
crises. 
 Just as problematic, provisions within the current federal laws are 
designed with smaller scale disasters in mind – such as floods, tornadoes, and 
winter storms.  No distinction is made between a blizzard that strikes Buffalo1 and 
a hurricane the magnitude of Katrina2.  Federal regulations and policies designed 
to meet the needs of smaller-scale disasters become roadblocks that hamper both 
the initial response and long term recovery when they are deployed to deal with a 
catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina or the September 11 attacks. 
 This article explores the existing disaster policy landscape within the 
United States with a focus on the Stafford Act, the cultural and political forces 
that produced it, and how the current system is ill equipped to aid in the response 
and recovery from major catastrophes.  The public debate stemming from the 
failures triggered by Hurricane Katrina and the slow rebuilding along much of the 
Gulf Coast will be better informed by an understanding of these factors. 
 
THE STAFFORD ACT 
 
Enacted in 1988 and last significantly amended in 2000, The Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act3 (the Stafford Act) is the 
centerpiece of federal disaster policy.  It defines how federal disasters are 
declared, determines the types of assistance to be provided by the federal 
government, and establishes cost sharing arrangements among federal, state, and 
                                                 
1 The October 2006 Blizzard in Buffalo, NY, was declared a major disaster by President Bush.  
For more information, see http://www.fema.gov/news/event.fema?id=7225  
2 Hurricane Katrina was declared a major disaster by President Bush.  For more information, see 
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18478  
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 local governments. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) carries 
out the provisions of the Stafford Act and distributes much of the assistance 
provided by the Act.   
 In the 1980s, as the costs of federal disaster relief efforts began to escalate, 
Congress questioned the President’s use of disaster declarations for non-natural 
disasters –primarily in response to President Carter’s use of the Disaster Relief 
Act to help manage the Cuban refugee influx into Florida and the Three Mile 
Island accident, among other incidents4. To address these concerns, Congress 
passed the Stafford Act5.  
 The Stafford Act limits the declaration of a major disaster to “Any natural 
catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven 
water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, 
snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood or explosion6.”  
Under this definition, the Cuban refugee crisis and Three Mile Island would not 
have qualified as a major disaster. In addition to defining the terms under which 
the President may authorize the use of federal funds to assist states and localities 
in need, the Stafford Act: 
 
• Established a 75-percent federal / 25-percent state and local cost 
sharing plan; 
• Provided public assistance for emergency work, repair and 
restoration, and debris removal; and 
• Emphasized mitigation, including the establishment of mitigation 
grants7. 
 
 The Stafford Act establishes two incident levels –emergencies and major 
disasters.  Emergencies are defined as “Any occasion or incident for which, in the 
determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement State 
and local efforts8.” This can include disseminating warnings and providing 
technical and advisory assistance to state and local governments, removing debris, 
and assisting in the distribution of medicine, food, and other supplies9.  Total 
                                                                                                                                     
3 42 U.S.C. 5121 et. seq. 
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FEMA Independent Study Course 292: 
Disaster Basics, op cit. 2-7. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 4121 et seq. (available online at http://www.fema.gov/library/stafact.shtm)  
6 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2) (available online at http://www.fema.gov/library/stafact.shtm)  
7 Mitigation grants are federal disaster grants aimed at lessening the impact that disasters have on 
both people and property. FEMA currently has three mitigation grant programs: the Hazards 
Mitigation Grant Program (HGMP), the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program (PDM), and the Flood 
Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program. 
8 42 U.S.C. 5122 
9 42 U.S.C. 5192 
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 federal assistance for any emergency may not exceed $5 million, except where the 
President determines further assistance is required10. 
 Alternately, the president may declare a major disaster if there is “damage 
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance.11”  Such 
a declaration brings to bear the full resources and authority of the federal 
government – as authorized under the Stafford Act – including utilizing the 
resources of the U.S. Department of Defense, providing search and rescue teams, 
and providing emergency medical care, shelter, and temporary facilities12.   
 Upon the declaration of an emergency or major disaster, up to $28,80013 in 
assistance can be provided to eligible households in the impacted area. This 
assistance is subdivided with caps for how much can be used for repairs, 
temporary housing, and other items. A major disaster declaration also allows the 
federal government to provide long-term recovery assistance, including up to $1.5 
million in Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) to small businesses, loans of 
up to $5 million to local governments to supplement lost tax revenue, and 
financial assistance to non-profit utility companies. Following a major disaster, 
the federal government will pay up to 75% of the cost of repairing or replacing 
state and local facilities and infrastructure damaged or destroyed by the disaster14. 
 The net result is that over the past 30 years, FEMA distributes, on average, 
$2 billion in Stafford Act related disaster assistance per year15. This funding 
comes from a Disaster Relief Fund established by Congress and funded each year 
based on projected needs. Following large catastrophes, however, Congress may 
pass emergency appropriations to provide additional assistance and establish 
temporary programs that go beyond the scope of the Stafford Act.  Following the 
1994 Northridge (Los Angeles) Earthquake, Congress appropriated $11 billion16.  
$40 billion was appropriated following the September 11 attacks17, and $110 
billion after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita18.   
                                                 
10 42 U.S.C. 5193 
11 42 U.S.C. 5122 
12 42 U.S.C. 5170 et seq. 
13 The law stipulates $25,000, as adjusted for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index.  In 
2007 dollars this is $28,800. 
14 42 U.S.C. 5170 et seq. 
15 Bea, Keith. Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible 
Activities, and Funding.  Congressional Research Service.  Page 8.  August 29, 2005.  Online at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33053.pdf 
16 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill – HR 3759, PL 103-211 
17 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill – HR 2888, PL 107-38 
18 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bills – HR 4939, PL 109-234 and HR 3673, PL 109-62 
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 FEMA 
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the federal agency 
responsible for coordinating and disseminating relief under the Stafford Act. Prior 
to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA was an 
independent agency that reported directly to the President.  However, the 
Homeland Security Act of 200219 -which established the Department of 
Homeland Security and provides the legal framework for the organization and 
activities of the department -moved FEMA into the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Under this new arrangement, FEMA continues to coordinate federal 
disaster response, but it has lost its independent decision making capabilities.  
FEMA must report to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and 
make decisions within the larger framework of the Department. 
 Under James Lee Witt, President Clinton’s FEMA director, the agency 
emerged as a global model for a federal disaster response agency. Witt brought in 
professional staff and received wide praise for FEMA’s response to disasters such 
as the 1993 Midwest floods, the Northridge Earthquake, and the Oklahoma City 
bombing20.  President George W. Bush, during a 2000 Presidential Debate, even 
remarked, “James Lee Witt of FEMA has done a really good job of working with 
governors during times of crisis21." 
 Following the 1993 Mississippi River floods, FEMA bought homes and 
businesses near the river and relocated the occupants to higher ground.  
According to the Los Angeles Times, the result for one Illinois town was “That 
although more than 400 people applied for disaster aid after the (1993) flood, only 
11 needed to apply two years later when the river again jumped its banks22.” 
 Under James Lee Witt, FEMA also loosened its regulations and “gave 
more aid more quickly,23” which contributed to a quicker and more effective 
response, but also renewed concerns that too much was being spent on disaster 
assistance.   
 During the late 1990s, Congress sought out additional approaches to 
control the cost of federal disaster assistance.  In 1998, the United States 
                                                 
19 Pub. L. No. 107-296 
20 Wayne, Leslie and Justice, Glen.  “FEMA Leader Under Clinton Makes It Pay.”  New York 
Times.  October 10, 2005.  Section A; Column 3, Page 1. 
21 Adair, Bill.  “Lessons his father didn’t share.”  St Petersburg Times.  September 8, 2005.  Page 
6A. 
22 Gosselin, Peter and Miller, Alan.  “Why FEMA Was Missing in Action.”  Los Angeles Times.  
September 5, 2005.  Online. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
fema5sep05,1,2869010,full.story?coll=la-headlines-nation 
23 Roberts, Patrick.  “FEMA After Katrina.”  Hoover Institution Policy Review #137. Online.  
http://www.policyreview.org/137/roberts.html.  Accessed February 14, 2007. 
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 Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report24 outlining specific 
approaches to reduce these costs, including the dedication of more resources to 
disaster mitigation.  The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 modified the Stafford 
Act by establishing a national program for pre-disaster mitigation and provided 
additional mitigation funding to states that develop “Enhanced Mitigation 
Plans25.”  Today, disaster relief in the United States is administered through 
FEMA according to the guidelines set forth in the Stafford Act and as amended by 
the Disaster Mitigation Act of 200026. 
 Although federal disaster relief policy has been subject to many changes 
since the passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, nothing transformed the 
legislative landscape as much as the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. The 
attacks thrust homeland security and counter terrorism into the forefront of the 
national political agenda and shifted disaster response from natural disasters back 




In June 2002, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created to 
realign “the current confusing patchwork of government activities into a single 
department whose primary mission is to protect our homeland27.” The creation of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security represented the most significant 
transformation of the federal government in more than half a century.  FEMA was 
one of the many agencies folded into the new department. 
 The creation of DHS offered an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive 
review and revision of disaster policy and establish a duel system that serves the 
needs of both natural disaster response and counter terrorism.  However, the laws 
and policies of FEMA were simply moved into the larger Department.  A new 
level of law and management in the form of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
the National Response Framework, and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, was blended on top of FEMA and the Stafford Act. 
 
                                                 
24 United States General Accounting Office, Disaster Assistance: Information on Federal Costs 
and Approaches for Reducing Them, Statement of Judy A. England-Joseph, Director, Housing and 
Community Development Issues, Resources, Community and Economic Development Division, 
March 1998 (available online at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98139t.pdf)  
25 “FEMA: The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.”  FEMA.  Online.   
http://www.fema.gov/plan/mitplanning/DMA.shtm Accessed February 14, 2007 
26 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 51221, et seq., 
as amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub L. No 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552 (2000) 
(the Stafford Act).  
27 “The Department of Homeland Security,” President George W. Bush, June 2002, p. 1 (available 
online at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/book.pdf)    
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  Prior to the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration singled its 
desire to limit the scope of the federal government in the area of natural disaster 
response.  Joe Allbaugh, President George W. Bush’s first FEMA director, 
summed up this desire in his May 2001 testimony before a Senate Appropriations 
subcommittee. 
 
“The original intent of Federal disaster assistance is to supplement 
State and local response efforts. Many are concerned that Federal 
disaster assistance may have evolved into both an oversized 
entitlement program and a disincentive to effective State and local 
risk management. Expectations of when the Federal Government 
should be involved and the degree of involvement may have 
ballooned beyond what is an appropriate level. We must restore the 
predominant role of State and local response to most disasters. 
Federal assistance needs to supplement, not supplant, State and 
local efforts28.” 
 
 The creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security accelerated 
efforts to reduce the size and scope of federal natural disaster response programs. 
After FEMA was folded into the DHS, three out of every four grant dollars 
provided by FEMA for local preparedness and first-responders went to terrorism 
related measures29 - in other words, $2 billion in grants to prevent terrorist 
attacks, but initially, only $180 million for natural disasters30.  Additionally, by 
simply being moved into the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA –which 
had been an independent cabinet level agency –suddenly became a small agency 
of approximately 2,500 employees competing for resources within a mammoth 
department of over 180,000 employees.  The federal government’s natural 
disaster programs became lost among a 21st century resurgence of civil defense. 
 In a 2003 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) warned 
that FEMA’s placement within the Department of Homeland Security had the 
potential to reduce FEMA’s focus on natural disasters and recommended that 
FEMA take steps to ensure this did not occur: 
 
                                                 
28 FEMA.  “Testimony of Federal Emergency Management Agency Director Joe M. Allbaugh.”  
FEMA.  Online. http://www.fema.gov/about/director/allbaugh/testimony/051601.shtm  Accessed 
November 8, 2007. 
29 Gosselin, Peter and Miller, Alan.  “Why FEMA Was Missing in Action.”  Los Angeles Times.  
September 5, 2005.  Online. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
fema5sep05,1,2869010,full.story?coll=la-headlines-nation 
30 Manjoo, Farhad.  “Why FEMA failed.”  Salon.com.  September 7, 2005.  Online.  
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2005/09/07/fema/index.html  Accessed September 25, 
2007. 
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 “Moreover, the placement of FEMA within DHS represents a 
substantially changed environment in which FEMA will conduct 
its missions in the future, and missions that focus on reducing the 
impacts of natural hazards, such as hazard mitigation and flood 
insurance may receive decreased emphasis. Sustained attention to 
these programs will be needed to ensure they maintain or improve 
their effectiveness in protecting the nation against, and reducing 
federal costs associated with, natural disaster31.” 
 
 Submitted almost two years before the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, 
the GAO report provided a word of warning about shortcomings within FEMA 
that have since been echoed in reports following Hurricane Katrina issued by the 




Hurricane Katrina revealed that despite advances in technology and 
communication, and despite the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, the country remains ill prepared to respond to and recover from a major 
catastrophe.  Systemic problems of management, resource allocation, and 
leadership within FEMA were also brought to light, which Congress has 
attempted to correct with the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
of 2006. 
 Signed by President Bush on October 4, 2006, the Post Katrina Act works 
to correct the most glowing errors of FEMA’s management following Hurricane 
Katrina and looks to build professional management and staff within FEMA.  For 
example, the Post Katrina Act requires the head of FEMA to be a professional 
disaster manager who possesses a “demonstrated ability in and knowledge of 
emergency management and homeland security; and not less than 5 years of 
                                                 
31 United States Government Accountability Office, “Disaster Assistance: Federal Aid to the New 
York City Area Following the Attacks of September 11th and Challenges Confronting FEMA,” 
Statement of JayEtta Z. Heckler, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, September 24, 2003, p. 
27-28 (available online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031174t.pdf)  
32 The White House. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, A Report 
Submitted to President George W. Bush by Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, February 23, 2006, (available online at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf)  
33 US House of Representatives. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, February 15, 
2006, (available online at http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm)  
34 US Senate. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared.  2006.  (available online at 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Links.Katrina) 
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 executive leadership and management experience in the public or private 
sector35.”  Previously, there had been no such requirement, and often the head of 
FEMA was a political appointee who had little or no previous disaster experience. 
To further improve professionalism within the agency, the Post Katrina Act also 
requires FEMA to develop a human capital plan and career paths for its 
employees, authorizes recruitment and retention bonuses, and offers educational 
programs for senior staff36.  
 To improve response, the Post Katrina Act establishes a new level for 
“Catastrophic Incidents37,” defined as:  
 
“Any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster 
that results in extraordinary levels of causalities or damage or 
disruption severely affecting the population (including mass 
evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national 
morale, or government functions in an area38.” 
 
 This new level of catastrophic incidents is designed to improve the 
immediate federal response following a catastrophe and provides “Regional Strike 
Teams39” and a “Surge Capacity Force40” to ensure that FEMA arrives as soon as 
possible and is backed up by enough staff to provide an effective response. 
 Changes were also made to the Stafford Act to develop a national disaster 
housing strategy41, provide more money for pre-disaster mitigation42, create 
programs to facilitate family reunions,43 and the location of displaced children44. 
However, the catastrophic incident provisions of the 2006 Post Katrina Act were 
not included in the Stafford Act – they are included in sections of law that deal 
with national emergency management –thus effectively adding a new layer of 
regulation and meaning that a disaster can now simultaneously be declared a 
“Major Disaster” under the Stafford Act, an “Incident of National Significance” 
under the National Response Framework, and a “Catastrophic Incident” under the 
Post Katrina Act.  
                                                 
35 PL 109-295, section 503(c) 
36 PL 109-295, subtitle B 
37 PL 109-295, sec. 602 
38 Public Law 109-295, sec. 602 
39 Public Law 109-295, subtitle 507(f) 
40 Public Law 109-295, section 624 
41 PL 109-295, section 683 
42 PL 109-295, section 684 
43 PL 109-295, section 689c 
44 PL 109-295, section 689b 




While the designation of a “catastrophe” under the Post Katrina Act brings 
additional resources to bear in the days following a catastrophe, it does not change 
the underlying concepts upon which federal disaster policy is built, nor does it 
guide long-term recovery. 
 Current federal disaster policy is designed with smaller scale disasters in 
mind – such as floods, tornadoes, and winter storms.  No distinction is made 
between a blizzard that strikes Buffalo45 and a hurricane the magnitude of 
Katrina46 – both can be declared a “major disaster” under the Stafford Act. 
 Well intended federal regulations and policies designed to meet the needs 
of smaller-scale disasters become roadblocks that hamper both initial response 
and long term recovery when they are deployed to deal with a catastrophe such as 
Hurricane Katrina or the September 11 attacks.  As Gil Jamieson, FEMA’s deputy 
administrator for Gulf Coast recovery explained, "There was a tendency in the 
early days to think we could run this as we might run a garden-variety disaster, 
but you just can't push that big of a pig through the pipe47."   
 Two years after Hurricane Katrina, 43,000 families in Louisiana still live 
in temporary trailers48.  Crime has skyrocketed in New Orleans, but the police 
superintendent continues to work out of a trailer, and the city’s DNA lab has not 
been rebuilt49.  Fewer than half of the public schools have reopened50.  Only 20% 
of the levees are as high as they should be51. 
 The definition of a “catastrophic incident” from the Post Katrina Act 
should be added to the Stafford Act to bring coordination between the two laws. 
Several changes, outlined below, should also be made to the Stafford Act to 
ensure its provisions do not again hamper response and recovery efforts. 
                                                 
45 The October 2006 Blizzard in Buffalo, NY, was declared a major disaster by President Bush.  
For more information, see http://www.fema.gov/news/event.fema?id=7225  
46 Hurricane Katrina was declared a major disaster by President Bush.  For more information, see 
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18478  
47 Jervis, Rick.  “2 years after Katrina, pace of rebuilding depends on who pays.”  USA Today.  
August 29, 2007.  Online. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-08-28-rebuild_N.htm  
Accessed September 27, 2007. 
48 Reid, Tim.  “Two years on, New Orleans and Bush still damaged by Katrina.”  The Times of 
London.  August 30, 2007.  Page 33. 
49 Jervis, Rick.  “2 years after Katrina, pace of rebuilding depends on who pays.”  USA Today.  
August 29, 2007.  Online. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-08-28-rebuild_N.htm  
Accessed September 27, 2007. 
50 Luce, Edward.  “Bush taken to task on empty promises to New Orleans.”  Financial Times.  
August 29, 2007.  Page 7 
51 McNutly, Sheila.  “Disaster leaves behind a tale of two cities.”  Financial Times.  August 29, 
2007.  Page 7 
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 LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES 
 
After Hurricane Katrina, the City of New Orleans was forced to lay off nearly half 
its workforce because there was not enough cash on hand to meet payroll 
obligations52. The Stafford Act authorizes federal disaster assistance to cover the 
overtime of local government workers for work related to responding to the 
disaster, but not regular salaries.   
 The Act also authorizes loans of up to $5 million to cover forgone tax 
revenues lost in the wake of disasters, but when faced with the loss of a 
significant proportion of the local tax base following a catastrophe, state and local 
governments do not have an adequate means to quickly recover forgone revenue 
and continue government services without supplemental appropriations from 
Congress.  After the September 11 attacks, New York City lost approximately 
$2.5 to $2.9 billion in tax revenue for FY 2002 and 200353.  According to a 
Congressional Research Service report, almost three-quarters of Louisiana state 
personal income and retail sales (72.8 percent and 72.2 percent, respectively) 
were generated in the declared disaster parishes, with 24.3 percent of personal 
income and 22.3 percent of all retail sales generated in the New Orleans 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA)54. 
 The Stafford Act should be amended to abolish the $5 million cap on 
loans to reimburse for lost tax revenue. In addition, sections of the Stafford Act 
that allow the federal government to fund overtime pay of public employees 
should be amended to allow the federal government to, in part or in full, pay the 
salaries of state and local public employees in areas stricken by a catastrophe for a 
limited amount of time.  This will ensure that areas affected by a catastrophe do 
not face the duel challenge of overwhelming devastation and a bankrupt local 




An underlying assumption of federal policy is that assistance to business and 
individuals should first come from insurance. The Stafford Act states, “The 
President… shall assure that no such person, business concern, or other entity will 
receive such assistance with respect to any part of such loss as to which he has 
                                                 
52 CNN.  “New Orleans to lay off 3,000 workers – Oct 4, 2005.”  CNN.com  Online.  
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/10/04/new.orleans/index.html Accessed April 2, 2007 
53 United States Government Accounting Office, “September 11: Recent Estimates of Fiscal 
Impact of 2001 Terrorist Attack on New York,” March 2005 (available online at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05269.pdf)  
54 Maguire, Steven, The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on the State Budgets of Alabama, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi, Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2005, p. 2-3. 
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 received financial assistance under any other program or from insurance or any 
other source55.”    
 It is essential for businesses and individuals to have insurance, and for the 
government to encourage insurance coverage in order to minimize the amount of 
taxpayer money spent following a disaster.  The problem is that, following a 
catastrophe, important documents needed by businesses and individuals to 
document ownership and proof of insurance may have been lost, making it 
difficult for people to apply and receive government assistance in a timely 
fashion. As Don Wilson, president of the national Association of Small Business 
Development Centers explained following Katrina, “Even if your CPA has copies 
of your records, their records may have been destroyed56.”   
 Even more troubling, insurance companies have moved to minimize loses, 
leaving victims in difficult financial positions.  In a bid to avoid payouts to those 
who had hurricane – but not flood – coverage following Katrina, insurance 
companies argued that the damage in New Orleans was caused by flooding, not 
the hurricane, and that the devastation along the Gulf Coast was caused by surge 
flooding, not hurricane winds57 58 59. In February 2007, State Farm was found by a 
federal judge in Mississippi to have acted in a “grossly negligent way60” after 
denying a homeowner’s claim following the hurricane61.   Numerous other 
Katrina related lawsuits against insurance companies are making their way 
through the courts, and in time judgments will be levied and settlements reached, 
resulting in payouts – but this may not come until years after the hurricane. 
 Even when insurance companies act to make payments, the devastation 
that follows a catastrophe can overwhelm the company and result in multi-month 
                                                 
55 42 U.S.C. 5155 
56 Abrams, Rhonda.  “Helping small businesses in wake of Katrina.”  USA Today.  September 1, 
2005.  Online. http://www.usatoday.com/money/smallbusiness/columnist/abrams/2005-09-01-
small-business-katrina_x.htm 
57 CNN.  “Katrina, time take their toll on Mississippi town – Feb 20, 2006.”  CNN.com  Online.  
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/02/17/koch.katrina/index.html Accessed April 2, 2007. 
58 USA Today.  “Crazy-quilt insurance system delays Katrina recovery.”  USA Today.  Online.  
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2007/01/photo_limbo_mis.html Accessed April 2, 2007. 
59 Treaster, Joseph.  “Judge Is Urged to Back Deal on Hurricane Damage Claims.”  The New York 
Times.  March 1, 2007  Online.   
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/01/business/01insure.html?_r=1&oref=slogin Accessed March 
1, 2007 
60 Kunzelman, Michael.  “La. Katrina Insurance Suit Begins.”  International Business Times.   
February 12, 2007.  Online.  http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20070212/add20-katrina-
insurance.htm Accessed March 1, 2007 
61 Kunzelman, Michael.  “Judge reduces jury’s $2.5 million award in Katrina insurance case.  
North Country Times.  February 1, 2007.  Online.   
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/02/01/news/nation/16_38_341_31_07.txt  Accessed March 
1, 2007 
11Moss et al.: The Stafford Act and Priorities for Reform
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
 delays for insurance payments.  Nearly 9 months after the hurricane hit, the 
insurance modeling firm ISO estimated that Louisiana had $24.3 billion in insured 
losses, but records from the Louisiana Department of Insurance showed that only 
half that amount - $12.5 billion – had been paid out by April 200662.  A year after 
Katrina, thousands in Mississippi were also still waiting for insurance payments63. 
 Government policy must continue to encourage insurance coverage so that 
insurance companies, not taxpayers, absorb the majority of the bill following a 
catastrophe.  However, the Stafford Act and its regulations should be modified to 
allow cash assistance – which is capped at $28,800 per household, and further 
subdivided with caps on repairs, temporary housing assistance, and other items – 
to flow to qualified homeowners and renters following a catastrophe without 
having to provide proof of insurance coverage.  This will provide devastated 
families with immediate assistance in order to begin the recovery process.  This 
assistance could later be reimbursed to the government when insurance coverage 




Following a catastrophe, the resumption of utilities – electricity, water, sewer, and 
telecommunications – is critical.  Lives can be saved and suffering minimized 
with functioning utilities.  According to the Federal Communications 
Commission, Hurricane Katrina destroyed more than 3 million customer phone 
lines, and more than a thousand cell phone sites64. Private telecommunications 
firms were among the first to repair destroyed communications lines, patching 
their way into New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina well ahead of the 
federal government.  However, utility workers are not treated as emergency 
responders.  As recounted in news reports, “BellSouth found a soggy, unhappy 
crowd of people outside its main downtown New Orleans switching facility soon 
after Katrina blew over. Company executives said they feared the crowd would 
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 try to forcibly enter the building to seize the food and water supplies inside – 
which could have disrupted the fragile telecommunications network even more65.”   
 Fearing for their safety, and with gun shots being fired, BellSouth was 
forced to evacuate the building, shutting down phone lines in New Orleans that 
were still functional. BellSouth had requested security escorts and “priority” 
access to food, fuel, water and shelter from the federal government, but were 
deigned because the Stafford Act does not recognize utility workers as 
“emergency responders66.” 
 The Stafford Act should be amended so that, following a catastrophe, 
utility workers are recognized as “emergency responders,” thus enabling them to 
receive security escorts and priority access to food, fuel, water, and shelter67. 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS 
 
To make up for limitations within the Stafford Act, Congress historically has 
appropriated billons of dollars and established special programs that provide 
additional assistance following a catastrophe. After the 1994 Northridge (Los 
Angeles) Earthquake, Congress appropriated $11 billion68.  $40 billion was 
appropriated following the September 11 attacks69, and $110 billion after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita70. 
 The distribution of this funding, along with Stafford Act assistance, is 
governed by an elaborate set of procedures. The result is that it takes months, if 
not years, for the responsible federal agencies to process and distribute the 
assistance. For example, nearly a year and half after Katrina, of the $42 billion 
given to FEMA, $25 billion has been distributed. The Army Corps of Engineers 
had spent $1.3 billion out of $5.8 billion for levee repairs, and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development had distributed $1.7 billion out of $17 billion 
received71.   
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  With the bulk of immediate rescue and recovery work, along with long-
term planning and rebuilding resting in the hands of state and local governments, 
a system that provides federal assistance to state and local governments as quickly 
as possible is paramount. 
 Often delays are not caused by provisions of the law, but exist within 
regulations and interpretations.  During the 1990s, FEMA successfully responded 
to catastrophes and major disasters like the 1993 Midwest floods and the 1994 
Oklahoma City bombing by relaxing the regulations that implement the Stafford 
Act72.  A similar result could occur if FEMA designed its Public Assistance 
Program in a fashion such that one damage survey and estimate was written for 
each affected community or state.  This would allow FEMA to quickly provide 
assistance to state and local governments in a form similar to a block grant.  
Where possible, money appropriated by Congress following a catastrophe should 
also be provided directly to state and local governments in the form of block 
grants.  This will eliminate the burden and associated time delays placed on 
federal agencies as they distribute the assistance, and it will give state and local 
governments flexibility in using the money as they see fit. 
 A general rider within the Stafford Act for catastrophic events, giving the 
President, in consultation with Congress, the authority to wave Stafford Act 
provisions and regulations following a catastrophe represents another effective 
means of providing regulatory flexibility following a catastrophe.  To prevent an 
open ended mandate, the rider could also require the President, after an initial 
damage assessment, and in coordination with Congress, to set a cap on the 
amount of immediate and long term recovery assistance that will be provided for 
the catastrophe. 
 
21ST CENTURY THREATS 
 
Looking to the future, Congress specifically exempted chemical, biological, and 
nuclear attacks and accidents from the Stafford Act in response to President 
Carter’s use of disaster regulations to respond to the Three Mile Island accident73. 
However, with the possibility of a terrorist attack involving a chemical, 
biological, or nuclear agent, the Stafford Act should be amended to include these 
types of disasters. 
 The President possesses power under other laws, including the National 
Emergencies Act,74 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
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 Compensation, and Liability Act of 198075 to respond to major disturbances of the 
public order, environmental disasters, and incidents that result in the release of 
hazardous substances76.  Title V of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 also gives 
Department of Homeland Security the power to act in the event of a nuclear or 
public health incident77.   
 Beyond causing a large number of causalities, a chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear attack or accident has the potential to devastate local 
economies, wreck havoc on infrastructure, and generate the need for temporary 
housing.  Recovering from such attacks or accidents could require extensive, 
long-term investment, which the major disaster assistance programs of the 
Stafford Act are designed to facilitate – but do not cover because a major disaster 
is defined to exclude these types of events. 
 If needed, the President may declare an emergency under the Stafford Act, 
but this limits federal assistance to $5 million, unless expanded by the President78.  
The definition of a major disaster should be amended to allow the full range of 
Stafford Act options to come into play during a chemical, biological, radiological, 
or nuclear attack or accident.  If the incident is of sufficient magnitude to qualify 
as a catastrophe, the catastrophic assistance provisions recommended by this 




Throughout the history of American disaster policy, existing federal government 
agencies with their own policies, objectives, and constituencies have been cobbled 
together to create new agencies, and layers of law have been added on top 
existing regulations without amending previous laws or revisiting the assumptions 
upon which they rest.  This has produced a system where disasters are governed 
by multiple regulations – the Stafford Act, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, and the National 
Response Framework – meaning a disaster can simultaneously be declared a 
Major Disaster, a Catastrophic Incident, and an Incident of National Significance, 
and be responded to in accordance with the provisions of all of those laws.  Any 
future attempts to modify the disaster management system in the United States 
must be conscious of this tendency and instead work to produce a system that 
harmoniously blends old and new elements. 
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  By failing to account for catastrophes, current American disaster policy 
has been unable to meet the challenges of large-scale events such as Hurricane 
Katrina.  Well meaning limitations designed with blizzards and tornadoes in mind 
have been transformed into roadblocks that hamper the ability of the government 
and private sector to respond and rebuild. 
 In an era in which the United States faces unprecedented challenges and 
threats to the safety and well being of its citizens, the Stafford Act must be 
amended.  State and local governments should not be forced to contend with an 
outdated federal disaster policy that does not recognize twenty-first century 
threats, does not address catastrophic incidents, and that delays long term 
recovery by channeling funds through an array of federal agencies instead of 
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